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Summary 
The rubber-hand illusion provides a window into body representation and consciousness. It 
has been found that body-ownership extended to numerous hand-like objects. Interestingly, 
the vast majority of these objects were three-dimensional. We adopted this paradigm by using 
hand drawings to investigate whether rubber-hand illusion could be extended to two-
dimensional hand samples, and we measured skin conductance responses and behavioural 
variables. The fact that this illusion extended to two-dimensional stimuli reveals the dominant 
role of top-down information on visual perception for body representation and consciousness. 
  
 
Keywords: rubber-hand illusion; body representation; body ownership; skin conductance; 
consciousness. 
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Introduction 
Perceptual (Gregory, 1968; Leibowitz et al., 1969) and cognitive (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1996) illusions provide unique opportunities to unveil mental representations and brain 
functioning. Illusions can involve more than one sensory modality and in this case they can 
provide a means to discover how the senses are combined (Choe et al., 1975; Geldard and 
Sherrick, 1972; Jousmäki and Hari, 1998; McGurk and MacDonald, 1976; Shams et al., 
2000).  In particular, the rubber-hand illusion (RHI, Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) combines 
visual and tactile perception to produce illusory ownership of an alien limb. Thus, studies of 
this illusion provide knowledge of how body representation and body ownership are 
established and maintained. Initially, it was believed that external bottom-up cues provided 
by vision and touch (i.e. multisensory) were at the core of RHI (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; 
Brozzoli et al., 2012; Graziano et al., 2000; Makin et al., 2008), thus suggesting that this 
information plays a pivotal role in body representation and sense-of-ownership. Later top-
down projections (e.g. self-attributions, Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) were taken into account, 
while only very recently interoceptive information has also been found to influence the RHI 
(e.g. heartbeat, Tsakiris et al., 2011).  
The first aim of our work was to further investigate the visual cues used to trigger the RHI. 
Crucially, Armel and Ramachandran (2003) reported that ‘non-hand’ objects can be 
incorporated into body representation; nevertheless this result was not replicated by 
subsequent studies (Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Therefore, there is an 
implicit consensus that only ‘hand-like’ objects can be incorporated into one’s own body 
representation. Crucially, these studies focused on three-dimensional hand samples or 
objects, while it is still unknown whether an impoverished, two-dimensional hand 
representation can trigger the rubber hand illusion. As a matter of fact, three- versus two-
dimensional rendering affects visual perception (Bennett and Vuong, 2006; Lee and 
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Saunders, 2011; Pasqualotto and Hayward, 2009), and object recognition (Tarr et al., 1998).  
Here we will explore the use of a two-dimensional object, that is, a white sheet with the two-
dimensional drawing of the participant’s own hand. This stimulus allowed us to examine 
whether a two-dimensional and degraded representation of a human hand can still elicit the 
rubber hand illusion. Extension of body ownership to the hand drawing will be tested by 
cutting the drawing while measuring palmar skin conductance (see Lader, 1967). A 
significant increment in skin conductance (Ehrsson et al., 2007) would indicate that body 
ownership extended to the drawn hand, thus cutting the paper hand would be like hurting 
oneself  –similar to what occurred to the fictional character ‘Dorian Gray’ (Wild, 1890). 
Aside skin conductance, we added a behavioural measure of proprioceptive drift (Tsakiris 
and Haggard, 2005), and a subjective report of the illusion on a Likert scale (Armel and 
Ramachandran, 2003). Finding that even two-dimensional objects, which are a mere 
depiction, can be incorporated into one’s own body would suggest that top-down projections, 
for example from the prefrontal cortex (Tomita et al., 1999), are even more relevant than it 
was supposed before.     
Material and methods 
Participants 
We tested 15 right-handed participants (8 females). Their ages ranged from 18 to 30, with a 
mean age of 23.33 (SD 3.18). All of them were students at Queen Mary University of London 
who gave their consent to take part in the investigation. The study was approved by the 
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee and the Bath Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee. 
Apparatus 
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The experiment involved two synthetic paintbrushes (2 cm wide) which were used to stroke 
both the participants’ real hand and the drawn hand. A customised black cardboard box was 
used to occlude the participant’s real hand; it was open-ended on the side facing the 
experimenter, and had a hand-sized hole for participants to insert their hand. Skin 
conductance was recorded by using a PsychLab™ Contact Precision Instruments skin 
conductance recorder. Two 8 mm silver-plated electrodes were attached to the participant’s 
right hand using the appropriate adhesive collar and electro-conductive saline paste. The skin 
conductance device was connected to an Acer Extensa 5220 laptop, which ran the 
PsychLab™ software for skin conductance recording and analysis. We used a Likert scale 
from 1 to 10 where participants rated how much they agreed with the sentence “Please rate 
how much the drawn hand felt like your own on a 1-10 scale, with a 1 meaning the hand felt 
nothing like your hand, and a 10 meaning it felt exactly like your hand” (see Armel and 
Ramachandran, 2003).  
Procedure 
After gaining participants’ consent and providing the instructions (they were warned that a 
paper-cutter was going to be used), each participant placed his/her dominant hand with its 
palm down on a vertically oriented white A4 sheet and the experimenter drew the contour of 
his/her hand –two identical copies were taken to be used in two different experimental blocks 
(see Fig. 1). Participants were subsequently seated at the table with their arm placed into the 
black box through its hand-sized hole. While inside the box, participants were connected to 
the electrodes; their index and middle fingers’ second phalanxes were connected to one 
electrode each. One drawing of their hand was placed on the table within the hemispace of 
the concealed hand (Cadieux et al., 2011). Before each of the two blocks (see below), by 
using their ‘free’ hand (i.e. the one not concealed into the box) and by keeping their eyes 
closed, participants pointed under the table where they felt the tip of the middle finger of their 
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concealed hand was located. The experimenter marked the position under the table as the 
baseline point for measuring the ‘proprioceptive drift’ (e.g. Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). 
Participants were asked to point again at the end of each experimental block; the distance 
between the pointing before (baseline) and the pointing after the blocks represented the 
proprioceptive drift. Positive values of the proprioceptive drift (in cm) indicated that the 
perceived location of the hand drifted towards the drawn hand, while negative values 
indicated a drift towards the real hand. Participants pointed once before and once after each 
block (totally four times).  
Then participants were asked to look at the drawn hand while their real hand was 
uninterruptedly stroked for six minutes in two blocks (e.g. Pavani and Zampini, 2007; 
Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). In one block the stroking was synchronous (i.e. stroking the 
same location at the same time on both the real and paper hands) and on the other block 
stroking was random (i.e. stroking different locations at different times). At the end of the 6-
minute stroking the experimenter activated the skin conductance recorder and, by using a 
paper-cutter, the drawn hand was cut five times (first at the fingertips level and then down to 
the wrist). After ‘cutting’, in both blocks participants were requested to repeat the 
proprioceptive pointing procedure (i.e. pointing underneath the table), and then they marked 
on the 1-10 Likert scale how much they perceived the illusion.  Between the two blocks, 
participants went to another room to complete an online questionnaire unrelated to the task 
for about 10 minutes. Half of the participants performed the synchronous block first, and the 
other half performed the random block first. The entire experiment lasted about 35 minutes. 
Participants received £5 for their time.  
The data output of each recording was visually inspected as presented on the PsychLab™ 
software. The recordings presented a pre-cutting baseline, an ascending slope in 
correspondence of the cutting, and a post-cutting plateau, which then degraded down to the 
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baseline. A one-second window was isolated immediately prior to the beginning of the slope 
and labelled pre-manipulation window, and another one-second window was isolated 
immediately at the peak of the slope and labelled post-manipulation window. Within both 
those one-second windows, the skin conductance values were recorded at 0.1 second 
intervals, providing 10 values for each window. The averages were used for the statistical 
analysis. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Results 
On this dataset we conducted a two-way within-subjects ANOVA with Type of Stroking 
(synchronous vs. random) and Time (pre-manipulation vs. post-manipulation) as variables. 
The Type of Stroking was significant [F(1,14)=11.01, p<0.01] suggesting that synchronous 
stroking produced stronger skin conductance responses (on average 0.43 μ-Siemens) than 
random stroking  (0.34 μ-Siemens). Time was also significant [F(1,14)=29.05, p<0.01] 
showing that skin conductance response was stronger after the cutting (0.40 μ-Siemens) than 
before (0.37 μ-Siemens). Finally, the interaction Type of Stroking by Time was significant 
too [F(3,11)=10.72, p<0.01]. We further analysed this interaction with Bonferroni post-hoc 
contrasts, which confirmed that for synchronous stroking there was a significant difference 
between pre-manipulation and post-manipulation [all p<0.05], which was not present for 
random stroking (see Fig. 2).We also verified that these results were not affected by the order 
of the two blocks, that might have triggered stronger skin conductance response in the first 
block due the ‘surprise’ effect. Thus, we subdivided our participants in two groups according 
to the order of the blocks (i.e. synchronous first or random first) and ran a two-way within-
subjects ANOVA with Block Order (Block 1 vs. Block 2) and Time (pre-manipulation vs. 
post-manipulation) as variables. Block Order was not significant [F(1,14)<1]; as expected 
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Time was significant [F(1,14)=29.05, p<0.01] showing that skin conductance response was 
stronger after the cutting than before. Finally, the interaction of Block Order by Time was not 
significant [F(3,11)<1]. This suggests that our results were produced by the experimental 
manipulation we performed rather than the mere testing order. 
Then, we looked at the proprioceptive drift, which on average was +1.2 cm (SD=2.00) after 
synchronous stroking (i.e. when asked to point to their concealed hand participants’ pointing 
drifted towards the drawn hand) and -0.27 cm (SD = 2.02) after random stroking (i.e. 
participants’ pointing slightly drifted towards the real hand). A paired-samples t-test 
confirmed this difference [t(14)=2.22, p<0.05]. Subjective reports on the vividness of the 
rubber-hand illusion recorded by the Likert scale showed that synchronous stroking produced 
a stronger illusion (4.7 points on average, SD = 1.62) than random stroking (2.63, SD = 
2.07); the difference was significant [F(1,14)=11.36, p<0.01].      
[Figure 2 about here] 
Discussion 
By showing that ‘hurting’ the depiction of somebody’s hand ‘hurts’ also its owner (i.e. 
Dorian Gray hand illusion) we showed that body ownership extended to a two-dimensional 
samples of hand. This finding extends previous results of studies using three-dimensional 
hands that were integrated in one’s own body representation (e.g. Capelari et al., 2009; 
Ehrsson et al., 2008; Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2010). It 
appears that hand-shaped objects, whether two-dimensional or three dimensional, are most 
likely incorporated into one’s own body representation. Thus the results of Armel and 
Ramachandran (2003) were not replicated by other studies (e.g. Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) 
due to the lack of a hand-shaped stimulus (see also Pavani and Galfano, 2007, for the effect 
of shadows on body ownership). As our ‘dummy’ hand was more degraded than the 
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‘realistic’ three-dimensional hands used in earlier studies, then we found evidence that the 
rubber hand illusion is more mediated by top-down processes than it was thought before; top-
down processing involves the abstract concept of one’s own hand (Ehrsson et al., 2004, 2005; 
Kammers et al., 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2008). For example, top-down processes involving 
long- and short-term memory have been found to influence both early (Gilbert and Sigman, 
2007) and late (Otsuru et al., 2014) stages of visual perception, such as visual perceptual 
learning (Li et al., 2004) and multisensory perceptual learning (Proulx et al., 2014). 
Therefore, it is conceivable that our visuo-tactile illusion can be produced by top-down 
projections from brain areas involved in memory and visual imagining (e.g. prefrontal cortex, 
Tomita et al., 1999), which exert an effect on the function of ‘lower level’ (i.e. more 
perceptual) brain areas (e.g. primary somatosensory cortex, Otsuru et al., 2014). Finally, top-
down processes such as self-consciousness (Blanke, 2012; Heydrich et al., 2010) have been 
found to play a role in body representation in medical conditions such as schizophrenia 
(Thakkar et al., 2011), alimentary disorders such as bulimia (Mussap and Salton, 2006), and 
unusual phenomena such as the out-of-body experience (Olivé and Berthoz, 2012).  
An alternative hypothesis is that, rather than top-down projection, bottom-up multisensory 
integration is the responsible for the illusion and for the altered sense-of-ownership; in 
particular multisensory integration of visual and tactile stimuli might remap the personal 
space to include the fake hand (Brozzoli et al., 2012; Costantini and Haggard, 2007; Gentile 
et al., 2013). Additionally, bottom-up information has been found to affect body-
representation relative to the hand (Dempsey-Jones and Kritikos, 2014), the face (Mazzurega 
et al., 2011), and the whole body (Slater, et al., 2010). Therefore, multisensory and bottom-up 
information might explain the altered sense-of-ownership. Nevertheless, the role of top-down 
projections (e.g. memory) was supported by the striking finding that rubber-hand illusion can 
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be elicited also in amputees who do not possess a hand for the remapping of bottom-up 
multisensory information (Ehrsson et al., 2008).    
In sum, by using the rubber hand illusion paradigm with our original approach we found 
evidence that the illusion extends to two-dimensional hand-like stimuli, suggesting that two-
dimensional stimuli should resemble hands (Dorian Gray hand illusion) to be incorporated 
into one’s own body, thus providing an explanation to previous discrepant results (Armel and 
Ramachandran, 2003; Haans et al., 2008; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Additionally, we 
found evidence that top-down processes might be more involved in body representation than 
it was thought before. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: Example of a drawn hand used in the experiment. 
 
Figure 2: Average skin conductance responses (in μ-Siemens) across the experimental 
conditions (‘Synch’ stands for synchronous stroking; ‘Rand’ for random stroking; ‘Pre’ is the 
value before cutting the drawn hand; ‘Post’ is the value after cutting the drawn hand). Error 
bars represent ± SE. 
 
